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Summary 
 
Background  
The clinical manifestations of Group A streptococcus (GAS) – (Streptococcus 
pyogenes) are diverse, ranging from asymptomatic colonisation to devastating 
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invasive disease.  Maternity related clusters of invasive Group A streptococcus 
(iGAS) infection are complex to investigate and control, especially if recurrent.  
Aim  
We report on the investigation into three episodes of emm 75 GAS/iGAS 
infection in maternity patients at one hospital site over a 4 year period, two with 
monophyletic ancestry.  
Methods  
The episodes are described, together with whole genome sequence isolate 
analyses. Single nucleotide polymorphism differences were compared with 
contemporaneous emm 75 genomes.  
Findings  
Seven mothers had GAS/iGAS in over a 4 year period, emm 75, S.pyogenes and 
one had iGAS (in year 4) emm 3, S.pyogenes (subsequently discounted as 
linked). Three (clinical/screening samples) of the seven babies of emm 75 
positive mothers and 3 screened healthcare workers were positive for GAS emm 
75. Whole genome sequence similarity suggests a shared ancestral lineage and 
suggested a common source transmission but directionality of transmission 
cannot be inferred. However the findings indicate that persistence of a particular 
clone in a given setting may be long-term.   
Conclusions  
Occupational health procedures were enhanced, staff were screened and 
antibiotic therapy provided to GAS positive staff and patients. The definitive 
source of infection could not be identified, although staff / patient transmission is 
the most likely route. The pattern of clonal GAS transmission over 4 years 
suggests long-term persistence of GAS may have occurred. 
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Introduction 
Group A Streptococcal infections have a spectrum of clinical manifestations 
(asymptomatic colonisation to severe invasive infections) occurring sporadically or in 
clusters. The incidence of invasive infection ranges from 1-3 cases/100,000 
population, with a case fatality of ~17% [1, 2]. Transmission is mostly via respiratory 
droplets/discharges or infected skin lesions [3]. Most GAS isolates are from the throat, 
but skin, vaginal, anal and perineal carriage have been noted; asymptomatic throat 
carriage is 5-12% [4-6]. 
 
Onward transmission can be reduced by robust infection prevention and control, 
prompt treatment of infection in cases and decolonisation through chemoprophylaxis 
in prolonged close contacts and colonised mother / neonate contacts. Wider 
chemoprophylaxis may be appropriate in some outbreaks, e.g. closed communities.   
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After a hospital acquired iGAS case, the probability of a second in the same hospital is 
~40% within 12 months and  9.3% of  hospital associated GAS infections are linked to 
others [1]. 
 
There is a particular association between iGAS and the peripartum / postpartum 
period [1, 7]. The age-specific attack rate for peripartum / puerperal period GAS is 
20 times that of non-pregnant females [8].  In 2003-2004, 2-11% of all severe 
GAS infections were associated with childbirth. Likewise between 1997-1999, 
puerperal GAS constituted 2% of all invasive GAS infections in the US/Canada. 
[5, 7]. Pregnancy associated iGAS occurs mostly in the peripartum, but has been 
reported during pregnancy and the later postpartum period. Peripartum iGAS 
carries a substantial maternal morbidity / mortality burden (25%), however the 
risk to the baby is greatest in antenatal iGAS, but still poses a substantial hazard 
to the new-born [9]. 
GAS strains can be distinguished by emm gene sequence analysis. In England 
between September 2015–March 2016, the most common emm types 
associated with iGAS were emm 1 (30%), 12 (12%) and 89 (11%)[10]. 
Puerperal sepsis is fortunately rare. Indeed there are few reports of outbreaks in 
maternity settings published in recent years, however they may remain 
unrecognised; outbreaks have been associated with infected healthcare workers 
(staff-members) and shared bathroom facilities [11-13].  
Two clusters and an isolated case of infection with emm 75 GAS were noted 
over a 4 year period in an acute hospital maternity unit providing in/outpatient 
and community maternity services. (These are hereafter named as the initial 
cluster, the isolated case 2 years later and last cluster 4 years after the initial 
cluster). We report the investigations into the source, the control measures 
instigated and the application of whole genome sequencing (WGS).  
Methods 
Outbreak control teams for each episode were established to investigate the 
potential source and implement control measures. 
Case definitions 
 
Confirmed 
 
A maternity staff-member/associated HCW working at the unit, or a maternity inpatient 
or baby born at the hospital in the 4 year period when cases occurred, with a 
confirmed isolate of emm 75 GAS from a clinical, i.e. infected or screening isolate, or 
colonised, isolate. 
 
Probable  
 
 
A maternity staff-member/associated HCW working at the unit, or a maternity inpatient 
or baby born at the hospital in the 4 year period when cases occurred, who had a 
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suspected GAS infection  and a GAS isolate identified or colonised with a GAS isolate, 
but with a non-emm 75 strain or no typing data available. 
 
The initial probable case definition was kept broad to include any emm typing positive 
isolate to maximise case capture until the situation was clear. However, any non-emm 
75 clone isolates/cases were subsequently discounted as being part of the outbreak. 
 
 
Possible 
 
A HCW from/inpatient admitted to, another part of the hospital, with suspected or 
confirmed GAS infection of any type/strain in the hospital in the 4 year period when 
cases occurred, with suspected GAS infection but without microbiological confirmation 
or typing data/matching emm type. 
 
Incidents 
 
Over the 4 year period, 7 mothers, 3 neonates and 3 Staff-members who were 
all confirmed, clinical cases, were reported with GAS/iGAS emm 75 infection. 
One other mother from the last cluster had emm 3 and was subsequently 
discounted as being part of the outbreak. Six mothers had iGAS and 1 (the 
index) had GAS infection, One baby and 3 Staff-members had non-invasive 
disease and 2 babies were colonised only. There were no deaths. The mothers 
(aged 22-39 years) received all their maternity care from the hospital; their 
babies were 1-44 days old at diagnosis. No neonatal cases were delivered by 
caesarean section. All mothers were well at admission for delivery, although 
one had an elevated white blood cell count. Three had recognised risk factors, 
other than pregnancy.  
In the initial cluster, the index case re-presented to hospital with postnatal 
complications; GAS was identified from vaginal sampling. Over the next 5 
days, 3 maternal iGAS cases occurred. One baby of these mothers developed 
a GAS skin infection, within 10 days of the presentation of the index, another 
was found to be colonised and the baby of index was found to have a positive 
throat swab 7 days after the presentation of the index. All cases in this initial 
cluster had emm 75 isolates. A patient with puerperal sepsis also presented 10 
days after the index, but no microbiological isolates were available for that 
case. 
A single, maternal, confirmed case of emm 75 iGAS was identified 2 years 
after the initial cluster, followed by 2 confirmed maternal emm 75 iGAS cases 4 
years later in the final cluster (symptomatic within 6 days of each other) and a 
single maternal emm 3 case, who became symptomatic 20 days after the first 
case in this last cluster. This latter case was subsequently discounted as being 
part of the outbreak. There were no neonatal cases in associated with the 
isolated case that occurred 2 years after the initial cluster or in the last cluster.  
Investigations and control measures undertaken 
 
Cases and their close contacts were treated as per standard guidelines. 
 
5 
 
Staff screening sampling results were obtained. GAS positive staff were excluded from 
work, treated and rescreened for clearance. Wider staff prophylaxis was not 
employed. 
 
For the last cluster, risk factors and symptoms, microbiology results and patient-staff 
interactions (dates/locations) were obtained. Ward movements were examined for 
staff/case overlaps and mapped against staff sickness absence records. Genome 
sequencing and emm sequence typing were undertaken. Environmental sampling was 
undertaken on the delivery suite after a deep clean had occurred and a month later 
(specific sampling site details are not available).  
 
Microbiological investigation 
 
Emm gene typing method 
 
The emm types were determined using the Centers for Disease Control protocol (table 
1). When sequence data obtained were ambiguous, alternative primers (MF1, 5′-
ATAAGGAGCATAAAAATGGCT-3′, and MR1, 5′-AGCTTAGTTTTCTTCTTTGCG-3′) 
were used [14]. 
 
Genome sequencing and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) calling was 
performed on 13 GAS isolates from the hospital and contemporaneous emm 75 
isolates from England as previously described using the emm 2 MGAS10270 
reference genome, RefSeq accession number NC_008022.1 as the closest available 
GenBank sequence [15]. This was used in the absence of an emm 75 reference 
genome using bwa-mem 0.7.5a [16]. Gubbins 1.3.3 was used to remove loci with 
elevated base substitution densities indicative of recombination, producing a multiple 
sequence alignment file containing only non-recombining variant positions [17]. These 
data were used to generate a maximum-likelihood tree using RAxML version 8.1.17 
using the following parameters: 
 
-f a (rapid Bootstrap-analysis and search for best-scoring ML tree in one program run) 
-m (substitution-model) GTRGAMMA  
-p (random-seed for parsimony inferences) 12345 
-x (random-seed for bootstrapping) 12345 
-# (number of runs) 1000 [18].  
 
Results 
Staffing sickness absence was available for the last cluster only however staff 
sampling results from the initial cluster (nose/throat swabs only), isolated case 2 years 
later (sample sites unknown) and last cluster (nose/throat ,+/- perineum sampling if 
first nose/throat screen was positive) incidents were obtained.  
 
In the initial cluster, at least 170 staff were screened with throat swabs/cultured for 
GAS; the specialities of the staff sampled were not known; one was positive for GAS 
emm 75 and had become symptomatic with throat symptoms only after all cases were 
diagnosed excepting the baby of the index, who was detected on screening. 
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With the isolated case 2 years later, 54 staff were documented as appropriate to 
screen by throat/wound swabbing and culture for GAS. These included 32 maternity-
staff with the remainder from other teams e.g. ITU. Of the 54 eligible staff, 35 were 
sampled with 25 being from the maternity department and all were screen negative. 
 
In the final cluster, staff screening was undertaken over 3 months. Throat/wound 
swabs were taken initially with the subsequent addition of nose and perineum samples 
for those screened later. In the first round, 371 staff (208 maternity-staff) were 
sampled, and in the 2nd to 4th rounds, 85, 78 and 72 (37, 35 and 31 maternity staff) 
were repeat sampled respectively; the number eligible for sampling was not known. 
Although 4 staff-members were GAS positive on screening, only one maternity staff-
member had the emm 75 strain and became unwell 4 days after the second emm 75 
case in the last cluster, but before the emm 3 case. The others had strains unrelated 
to the outbreak. Additionally, a symptomatic staff-member from a different department 
was identified as having an emm 75 isolate 3 months later. This suggests emm 75 
may have been circulating more widely in other staff within the hospital and supports 
the hypothesis that staff were the unwitting source in these incidents. 
 
Routes of transmission 
 
Four possible transmission routes were investigated:  
1. Mother-to-mother transmission 
No mother was present in more than one cluster (i.e. did not deliver a baby at the 
maternity unit in each of the affected year clusters); it is therefore unlikely that an 
individual chronic carrier mother could have been the primary vector responsible for 
mother-to-mother transmission in all three clusters. Two overlapped for one day in the 
initial cluster on the delivery suite but were in separate rooms; all 4 had been in the 
maternity unit within a 7 day period. The first and second mothers in the last cluster 
overlapped in the delivery-suite on the day the first was readmitted with a positive GAS 
isolate, occupied the same delivery room during delivery and same postnatal ward bay 
but with a 3 day separation respectively.  
2. Staff-patient-staff transmission  
Emm 75 was found on staff-screening in the initial cluster, with one maternity staff-
member found to be colonised and in the last cluster, again with one maternity staff-
member found to be infected plus an additional non-maternity unit staff-member.  
 
No direct link between a single staff-member and all cases was identified; however 
two staff had contact with one or more cases in each of the episodes.  
 
The staff-member who was GAS positive in the initial cluster was present and cared 
for 5 of the cases then, but only became symptomatic after all the cases had 
presented, except the baby of the index whose isolate was detected on screening. 
This staff member was also involved in the care of the single case 2 years later, but 
was not present for the last cluster. The GAS-positive maternity staff-member in the 
last cluster had contact with the index case of that last cluster >2 weeks before onset, 
but didn’t develop symptoms until after the last cluster index case had presented, but 
did have contact with 3 of the cases (2 mothers, 1 baby) in the initial cluster within 3 
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days of their infection being identified. One staff-member was common to 2 cases in 
the last cluster and another to all 3 cases in that cluster, but no positive isolates were 
obtained from them. 
 
3. Staff-staff transmission 
In the last cluster, some staff-members had worked while symptomatic with potential 
GAS infections, e.g. sore-throat. However, this was only after the index and second 
case in the last cluster had already presented, making it less likely they were the 
primary vectors (more likely to have been downstream recipients). In the first round of 
screening in the last cluster, 371 staff were sampled; follow-up sampling was 
attempted for a further three-rounds to try to increase detections, however fewer were 
re-sampled on each occasion, 85, 78 and 72 respectively, meaning that other 
asymptomatic staff who were not sampled could have been the primary vectors, but 
remained undetected, or that where negative results were obtained that the organisms 
present were below the limit of detection. 
 
4. Environmental transmission 
During the investigations of the last cluster the unit was examined for infection 
prevention and control compliance; some deficiencies were noted, e.g. blood 
contaminating a privacy curtain, clinical equipment placed on waste bin tops. 
Recommendations for improvements were made. GAS was not isolated from 
environmental sampling (however the sites sampled were not available to the 
outbreak team, so the appropriateness of sampled sites or the sampling 
methods used was not known).  
Genomic sequencing analysis 
 
Whole genomic sequence analysis showed the initial and last cluster isolates were 
located within a clade with a shared ancestral lineage suggesting common source 
transmission; however transmission directionality could not be inferred. The isolates 
were separated from all others by at least 9 SNPs. No other contemporaneous 
isolates from national emm 75 GAS strains were located within this clade (Figure 1). 
The single case isolate that arose 2 years after the initial cluster did not have an 
immediate common ancestor to the initial or last cluster isolates. 
 
Discussion 
No mother was present in more than one cluster; it is therefore unlikely that an 
individual chronic carrier mother could have been the primary vector 
responsible for mother-to-mother transmission in all the clusters. However 
mother-to-mother transmission may have occurred within the individual cluster, 
e.g. 2 mothers overlapped in the initial cluster on delivery suite for one day but 
had no direct contact, making this less likely and in the last cluster two 
occupied the same bay/bathroom and delivery-suite room but on different 
days. It is also unlikely the mothers were separately importing GAS leading to 
multiple re-introductions into the hospital environment as there was little 
evidence of circulating community emm 75; nationally only 3.2% and regionally 
3% were emm 75 during the period and all of the regional emm 75 isolates 
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resulted from this incident, suggesting emm 75 is relatively uncommon in 
invasive disease.   
The recurrence of clonal GAS clusters over such an extended 4 year period is 
unusual. The initial and final cluster isolates were closely related, with a common 
ancestor and are distinct from other emm 75 isolates. The variation observed between 
the initial and final cluster isolates is indicative of acquired variation consistent with 
genetic drift over time. The number of single point mutations (single nucleotide 
polymorphisms or SNPs) estimated to occur in the GAS genome (based on analysis of 
emm 1/12 type strains) has been estimated at 1.37 to 1.8 SNPs per core genome per 
year. [19, 20]. The genetic distance between the initial and last cluster maternity unit 
clade of isolates is consistent with these estimates. The 9 SNPs that separate the 
maternity unit clade from all other isolates in this study represent an approximate time 
of 6.5 years.   
 
It is possible the initial cluster strain could have persisted in the hospital environment 
and/or in one or more colonised staff until the last cluster; however such a long-
duration (greater than two years) of clonal-persistence has not been previously 
described.  
 
There are three possible explanations for the emergence of a second clonally linked 
cluster four years after the first infection episode: 
 
1. Treatment / screening failure in the initial cluster with one or more staff-
members retaining asymptomatic emm 75 GAS colonisation/shedding, leading 
to ongoing staff-staff, staff-patient, staff-environment transmission. It has 
previously been demonstrated that asymptomatic carriage is less effectively 
cleared by treatment, than for symptomatic cases [21]. 
2. A persistent external source/s reintroducing GAS to the hospital, e.g. staff-
members / relatives. 
3. Persistence of environmental contamination. GAS has been documented to 
persist in fomites for up to 6½ months [22].  
Definitively confirming any of these hypotheses is not possible, however the first is the 
most plausible, since staff colonisation was found, no inanimate reservoir was 
detected and emm 75 GAS / iGAS disease is rare. Supporting this; asymptomatic, 
colonised staff-members and symptomatic staff-members have been previously 
demonstrated to account for 34% and 8.2% of all GAS outbreaks respectively and 
carriage with the same strain in close contacts of a GAS-infected case can approach 
30% [5, 23]. Staff may have unwittingly transmitted GAS to each other leading to 
persistence in multiple staff-members. Control measures were therefore targeted at 
interrupting transmission from staff, including the screening of staff to detect carriers, 
attention to handwashing and infection control procedures. 
 
WGS was useful for supporting the linkage of cases and determining that the clusters 
were genetically distinct from other emm 75 isolates, however more contemporaneous 
isolates would have been helpful to indicate more clearly the incidence of infections / 
prevalence of carriage of this particular clade.  
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Although staff screening was undertaken, the logistics of sampling and particularly 
repeat sampling a large group of individuals was challenging; screening effectiveness 
is also limited by sample quality and false negative results. Data quality was also an 
issue; data on the location of mothers was incomplete, not all staff-patient interactions 
were documented and staff signatures were frequently unclear. Increased duration 
and proximity of staff / patient interactions may increase the chances of transmission; 
however it is unusual for these details to be noted in clinical records. 
 
While environmental surfaces have been recognised as the source of maternity GAS 
outbreaks, for example, GAS remain viable on fomites for up to 6½ months and 
shower heads, curtains, baths, bidets and toilet seats have been previously implicated 
and transmission vectors, and there were some infection control deficiencies identified, 
sampling nonetheless found no evidence of environmental GAS contamination [5, 22, 24]. 
Environmental sampling was performed with dry swabs after deep-cleaning which may 
have reduced detections. The sites sampled were also not available to the outbreak 
team so their relevance was not known. Moistened / specific environmental swabs or 
directly applied plates may have produced more meaningful results [24]. Although 
speculative in the absence of clearer environmental sampling data, it is unlikely a 
single persistent environmental source was responsible due to the time between the 
two episodes. It is more likely the environment acted as a temporary, intermediate 
vector. Even with systematic, environmental sampling using moistened swabs, areas 
of contamination may be missed, so negative swabs are not necessarily indicative of a 
non-contaminated environment. The focus therefore should be on assuming that there 
may be temporary contamination of the care environment and robust cleaning to 
reduce such contamination to a minimum.  GAS prevention and control guidelines 
recommend ‘communal facilities, including bathrooms / toilets, are cleaned and 
decontaminated after each use especially on delivery-suites, post-natal wards and 
other high-risk areas’ [5]. At the time of the last cluster the cleaning regime was 
consistent with other NHS practice, namely twice daily cleaning, however cleaning was 
subsequently increased to decontaminate after each patient use. Further research on 
the optimal cleaning frequency for such high risk areas is warranted.  
Conclusions 
Recurrent clonal outbreaks of GAS/iGAS spanning comparable durations to this 
incident and emm 75 outbreaks related to childbirth appear rare. We postulate that 
recurrent infections seen with isolates within the emm 75 monophyletic group occurred 
over a four year period due to asymptomatic carriage in maternity staff-members, with 
transmission to patients.   However, other modes of transmission cannot be excluded. 
Increased monitoring and vigilance is essential, particularly if more cases with the 
emm 75 type are identified. Staff and patient education will be a valuable tool in 
preventing any future cases. No further cases have been noted at the time of writing, 
(March 2018). 
Authorities investigating maternity related outbreaks should be aware that prolonged, 
clonal isolate outbreaks are possible over a period of years, indicating that robust 
efforts to identify, control and eradicate the common source are needed, particularly 
given the seriousness of puerperal sepsis. Fortunately all invasive cases recovered in 
these incidents, but some were very ill, so the outcome could have been very different. 
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